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doi:10.1016/j.otsr.2011.03.008ndustry responded by initiating an in-depth transformation
f its organization and its practices, setting off a cultural
ransformation.
During this time, surgery and anesthetics underwent
remendous technical progress, contrasting with the slight
eduction in the rates of incidents and accidents related to
edical error, in particular in surgery. It therefore seems
ertinent to raise the question of how we function in this
omain.
ecognizing the problem
n 1991, Brennan and Leape published in the New England
ournal of Medicine the results of a study based on a ran-
omized review of more than 30,000 charts of patients
ospitalized in the state of New York reporting iatrogenic
ncidents and accidents. This publication had an important
mpact within the medical community but also elsewhere:
edical error had arrived at the forefront of the media
tage.
In 1994, Leape attempted to explain the causes of med-
cal errors: he adopted the ideas promoted by Reason, an
nglish psychologist who had worked in industry. Reason
mphasized that error is individual and inherent to the
uman condition and distinguished the active errors from
atent deﬁciencies: he viewed errors more as deﬁciencies of
he system than as individual faults. ‘‘Although we cannot
served.
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hange the human condition, we can change the conditions
n which humans work,’’ said Reason. This is the conceptual
ypothesis around which all risk management and patient
afety improvement processes would later be organized.
It took several years for risk management programs to be
mplemented. This reluctance to accept the very possibility
f medical error when things went wrong is largely due to
ur education and culture — in particular our surgical culture
that relates failure to personal fault.
Setting up concrete measures aiming to improve patient
afety encountered obstacles that seemed even greater.
ur surgical learning is centered on acquiring its techni-
al aspects and leaves no or very little room for teaching
ommunication methods or training physicians to work
ithin a group. Our organization remains compartmental-
zed, each speciﬁc task is often carried out with great
echnical skill, but absent and imprecise communication
etween team members or with other units (sterilization,
tock management, postsurgical recovery room, etc.) is fre-
uent, without a common goal being deﬁned, which leads to
ncidents such as operative site errors, the necessary mate-
ial being unavailable, etc.
Risk management programs have taken a variety of
orms, accreditation processes have been imposed on
ealthcare institutions, and more recently we have been
ncouraged to gain personal accreditation from the French
ational Authority for Health (Haute Authorité de santé
HAS]) and to adhere to dedicated structures such as Ortho-
isq, which federates the practitioners involved in this
rocess.
These measures have often been perceived as additional
dministrative restrictions, whose meaning and relation to
atient care sometimes seem ambiguous, with apparently
ew concrete responses to the speciﬁc risks involved in oper-
ting room activity. Similarly, the tools necessary to take
ction such as declaration of seminal events, checklists, and
orbidity—mortality reports are no clearer than pieces of
puzzle whose overall image is unknown to us or at best
ebulous.
hange is possible
aced with accidents and their media coverage, beginning in
995 American civil aviation set up a very ambitious and res-
lute program to control risks and improve passenger safety.
nown as the Commercial Aviation Safety Team, this pro-
ram attempted to meet the goal of reducing the number
f accidents by 80% in 10 years and thereby succeeded in
eeting this objective.Four broad lessons can be retained
rom this program:
standardization of procedures;
use of the checklist to ensure that validated procedures
are applied consistently;
improvement of team work and communication to reduce
errors (Crew Resource Management Training Program);
use of scientiﬁc methods, emphasizing the collaboration
of all participants, to identify and reduce risks.
This program aimed to instigate permanent safety
mprovement.
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There are important differences between our practice
nd civil aviation. The multiplicity of the types of incidents
n surgery makes both their collection and statistical use
ifﬁcult. Like industry, civil aviation is a clearly hierarchi-
al structure. The leadership has the power, including the
nancial power, to institute quality control processes. The
urgeons’ place is at the side of the hospital hierarchy, our
phere of activity is limited when concrete measures involve
everal departments that depend on the hospital leadership,
or example sterilization, stock and implant management,
nd infectious risk management policy, particularly if these
easures have a ﬁnancial impact. However, the common
oints between the cockpit and the operating room have
een mentioned by many authors, suggesting that some of
hese methods can be applied in our ﬁeld.
A number of individual and collective processes have
een instituted over the past few years. Few results in terms
f improved rates of incidents and accidents have been
eported, however. Pronovost’s work at John Hopkins Hos-
ital in Baltimore on reducing the risk of infection when
etting up a central venous line should be mentioned or,
loser to our practices, the work led by Moorman at Beth
srael Deaconess Medical Center in Boston on building safer
perating room teams (Harvard research program).
These experiences have one point in common: they have
emonstrated the importance of communication problems
nd the role played by the team as the driver of change. They
evisited the lessons of civil aviation, which were themselves
irectly inspired by the profound changes in the organization
f industrial production beginning in the 1970s.
To assist us in understanding and taking inspiration from
his mutation, Pierre-Marie Gallois, a renowned interna-
ional specialist in industrial excellence, honored us by
resenting the history, concepts, and methods that have
roved themselves in the amelioration of industrial perfor-
ance.
he experience of industry (P.M. Gallois)
major transformation showing the limits of
raditional organizations
f the ﬁrst industrial revolution turned the 19th century
pside-down, the second, illustrated by Charlie Chaplin’s
‘Modern Times,’’ was just as upsetting and shook up the
0th century. Ford and Taylor, to mention but two pro-
agonists, scientiﬁcally organized work and industrialized
roduction. The resulting organizational principles prevailed
ntil the ﬁrst oil crisis in 1973, which tolled the end of the
0-year boom after World War II and opened the way to a
hird industrial revolution that would leave a considerable
ark on deep-seated practices and organizations.
As early as the 1980s, the established order changed
rofoundly. Saturation of markets has stimulated compe-
ition and allowed demand, and therefore the client, to
ake power. Simultaneously, by broadening the scope of
ossible activities, progress in electronics, robotics, and
omputer sciences opened extraordinary perspectives of
evelopment. Finally, in industrialized countries, with the
ducational level in constant growth, labor was increasingly
ualiﬁed and the gap between skills and roles widened.
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Beyond price, it was quality, time, and customization,
and then innovation and speed that became the true factors
of competitiveness; thus, creativity, adaptability, coopera-
tion, and robustness were the essential characteristics of
organizations.
Taylor, who had separated those who think from those
who do, had conﬁned each person to a given place, with
production efﬁciency resulting in the strict application of
standardized operational methods. The know-how of a few
who thought was thus encapsulated and made available
to all the others who were expected to provide no more
than knowledge of their work station, the necessary pre-
cise movements within this station, and adherence to the
imposed rhythm. This conception of the organization that
had in its time proved its efﬁcacy was not the appropriate
response to these new challenges.
Toyota’s approach, initiated in Japan in the 1960s, by
placing the client and quality at the center of its activity and
considering that progress was a permanent and collective
activity because it returns the place of intelligence to each
and every employee, was the obvious true alternative to
dying Taylorism.
A weighty heritage
Changing the rules of the competitive game led industry to
view their organizations from a different perspective. Con-
sidering them through the lens of the client and speed, they
appeared in a different light.
Activity consuming resources
Most activities that consumed resources and generated a
time lapse actually have no added value, i.e., they have no
true utility for the client. For example, in no particular order
one can cite transferring, recopying, verifying, displacing
and being displaced, searching for, ‘‘doing and undoing,’’
‘‘packaging, unpackaging, and repackaging,’’ putting away
and taking out, repairing, redoing, etc. Eliminating or at
least reducing part of these activities requires profoundly
revising processes and operating modes.
Complexity and division of work
The combination of a growing complexity and continued
division of work leads to a multiplication of interactions. The
quality of the productive act is conditioned by the proper
execution of many other surrounding activities, upstream
and downstream, of preparation, support, administrative
processing, etc. Even with a high service rate in each of
these contributing activities, the probability of proper exe-
cution of the basic operation remains low and can only be
increasingly low if the organization of work is not deeply
modiﬁed.
With this diagnosis in place, the endogenous causes could
be identiﬁed, bringing into view three deep-rooted levels.
• Technical weaknesses such as lack of ﬂexibility in certain
production modes, the low level of robustness of primary
processes, the low reliability of complex equipment, the
inadequacy of implementations, insufﬁcient dissemina-
tion of methodological and managerial know-how, etc.
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Deﬁciencies caused by the organization’s unwieldiness,
the insufﬁcient cooperation between different depart-
ments and with service providers, the complexity and
slowness of decision making, the poor use of skills, etc.
Inappropriate behaviors in the highest ranks, including the
lack of conﬁdence toward collaborators, both internal and
external suppliers, followed by lust for power, then by the
lack of recognition, preoccupation with the short term,
etc.
The challenge of global performance is therefore tech-
ical, organizational, but also and most particularly,
ehavioral. In other words, the search for efﬁciency
s becoming as much an affair of rationality as of
ulture.
he fatal quality
ore concretely, this transformation has come about
hrough the mastery of quality and risks, quality in the broad
ense, the ability to respond to the explicit and implicit
equirements of demand.
Quality is not only the product or service conforming to
peciﬁcations, but it also means simpliﬁcation, ﬂuidity, and
herefore speed because by getting it right the ﬁrst time
t eliminates revision and correction activities as well as
nspection and veriﬁcation activities; quality is also creativ-
ty and progress in the development of an offer that responds
roactively to latent needs; quality is above all a federat-
ng dimension through the cooperation of all the company’s
ctors at all levels of client—supplier relations that pro-
ides meaning in channeling energies toward client services,
oth internal and external. Quality is a culture dedicated to
ervice.
Seen from this perspective, one can no longer con-
ider that quality is obtained by simply sorting before
elivering to separate what complies with a standard and
hat does not; this vision is an operational and eco-
omic absurdity, which, even if it limits risk for clients
oes not serve them and removes a sense of responsibil-
ty from the entire organization. Indeed, there is great
emporal and spatial distance between the observation of
rrors, defects, daily problems and their root causes in
he choices of investments, organizations, the deﬁnition of
perational modes, etc. Would it not be better to dedi-
ate ‘‘a little’’ intelligence and energy in preventing and
mproving the upstream processes rather than wasting ‘‘a
ot’’ of time and resources downstream to correct and
ort?
So-called total quality can only be the result of an
perational mode that encapsulates within processes (begin-
ing with product design, resources, and organizations),
hat prohibits the generation of non-quality (by control-
ing processes, incorporating error anticipation, etc.), or
t least that prevents the propagation of such (by devel-
ping self-veriﬁcation, etc.), which constantly identiﬁes
nd analyzes any discrepancies arising to feed a per-
anent progress procedure so as to continually advance
oward greater robustness. This is what I call ‘‘fatal’’ qual-
ty.
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oundations of organizations that control
uality and risks
hen organizations capable of fatal quality are analyzed —
ntities that developed ﬁrst in an industrial world and then
rogressively in the services — one can only observe that,
eyond the techniques and methods implemented, they are
ll based on three fundamental pillars.
he reality principle
n the ﬁeld, in the nitty-gritty of the situation, this is the
nly place a business can exist, where it is confronted with
he obligation for quality, service to the client. It is also the
lace where the impact of good or bad decisions, choices or
on-choices from the rest of the organization, are materi-
lized. Yet, although the actors in the ﬁeld are those who
ossess the best knowledge of the real world, its problems,
nd possible leads for improvement, paradoxically they have
either the means nor the authority to act.
The reality principle consists in reversing the traditional
ierarchical pyramid to install this ‘‘ﬂoor’’ at the center,
o give it the power to improve and put the line of com-
and as well as the support functions at its service. In so
oing, the organization principle is formulated as follows:
he ﬁeld serving the client and the rest of the business serv-
ng the ﬁeld. This is made possible by management that
akes itself available, is attuned to the client’s needs, giv-
ng meaning to its activities, and kindling the desire to push
imits by developing relations of the master—student type,
f not father—son relations, paternalism in the best sense of
he term, which gives rise to growth.
Application of this principle naturally leads to encour-
ging the visual, both for operational management and for
riving progress. Accepting to see and understand reality,
ccepting that it be the reﬂection of the rest of the orga-
ization and most particularly of the business’s mode of
anagement, accepting to give it power, that is the ﬁrst
illar of efﬁcient organizations.
he progress principle
ontrolling quality and risks and improving efﬁciency are
ot simply implementation of a change consisting of modi-
ying current operation to come up to standard and regain
new stable state engraved in stone. Evolving becomes a
ontinual and fundamental activity requiring permanently
nd radically reinventing the company while reinforcing
he incremental ﬁght against all forms of non-quality
n daily management. Progression through rupture or by
eaps assumes a clear ambition sustained by a descending
pproach managed by dedicated teams, associating antici-
ation and imagination with knowledge of the realities of
he real world. Daily progress, on the other hand, means
strategy for actions distributed and entrusted to each of
he business’s individual members; their capacity for detec-
ion and action will have been reinforced to accomplish this
ask.
Accepting the progress principle means giving a new
lace to the human element, to all the individuals in
i
l
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he company by transforming them from simple specta-
ors into actors or even authors of their organization.
o illustrate this point, I always remember the words
f two executives that I had the opportunity to work
longside in Japan, the ﬁrst asserting that ‘‘we are no
onger paid to produce parts but to improve the pro-
esses that produce them,’’ and the second convinced
‘that a factory without personnel is condemned because
t is incapable of progress.’’ I completed these state-
ents with the following: ‘‘the role of management is
o allow its teams to produce ideas and to implement
hem.’’
Once the phase of remediation and updating of the
ajor performance disparities has been accomplished, a
ell-conducted approach to progress gives this impression
f ‘‘serenity,’’ in any event a well-organized fundamen-
al movement, a movement of calm efﬁcacy. This is the
ype of sign that identiﬁes the highest-performance busi-
esses.
Progression of the business and progression of men and
omen cannot be dissociated and are mutually energizing.
he dynamics of progression combine two characteristics:
igor and high standards. Rigor is materialized by a logi-
al sequence connecting the observation of a problem or
divergence with regards a required level of quality, the
dentiﬁcation of causes, focus on the important cause, the
earch for control levers, action on the main control lever,
bservation of the result, with this process gradually con-
inued while accepting the principle of trial and error, until
he problem is eradicated or the objective met. At the same
ime, high standards are expressed as the will to contin-
ally extend the limits of quality, ensure that the process
nd the rise toward an ever higher level of efﬁciency is
ermanent.
Accepting the principle of permanent improvement
eans, ﬁnally, accepting the paradoxical idea that the prob-
em is the source of progress. Consequently, this does not
ean searching for any particular culpability and punishing
n eventual fault, but rather seizing the opportunity to go
ack to the root causes in an attempt to eliminate them.
here is no sustainable progress without this managerial
ttitude.
Permanent progress with its twin — continual learning —
group quest for perfection, set up as one of the business’s
ajor processes, is the second pillar of organizations that
ontrol quality issues.
he teamwork principle
t is not possible to improve what one cannot see, accord-
ng to the reality principle, but it is also impossible to
mprove what is not in one’s possession. The sentiment,
r rather the need for belonging is another condition
f progress. The progress principle also reminds us that
he dynamics of improvement only becomes sustainable if
ll assume this improvement at their individual level, if
ach one is its author. Finally, opportunities for increas-
ng efﬁciency have gradually been displaced; they are no
onger at the level of each elementary activity, but more
articularly in how they are combined: productivity of oper-
tions has little by little given place to the productivity of
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interoperations. Yet the interoperations are curiously the
domain of both nobody and everyone. Only with a multi-
disciplinary eye and with an interest in detail, where the
devil is always hiding, will it be possible to understand
them and optimize them. Intelligence yes, but group intel-
ligence.
Three reasons naturally lead to considering the team and
more speciﬁcally the empowered team as the basic ele-
ment, the core of high-performance organizations. These
teams allow greater quality, reactivity, and agility; they
assume and organize their physical and cognitive environ-
ment, in which the visual plays an essential role; they are
multidisciplinary and multitasking; the members are versa-
tile and multiskilled, they distribute roles, the necessary
game tactics, according to the situation. Finally, at the
peak of their maturity, they are learning-oriented, they
capitalize and disseminate their know-how, they initiate,
organize, and lead in individual and collective skills acqui-
sition.
An empowered team is a group of collocated individu-
als, connected through a shared ambition, who cooperate,
learn, and evolve together. The team is characterized
by a mission, a territory, a human size, multidisci-
plinary skills, roles to play, a simple managerial structure,
stability over time, and an animation system. The vis-
ible part of team operation is this animation system
based on perfectly punctuated rituals (daily, weekly,
monthly, etc.), visual tools such as management boards
displaying indicators, objectives, results, action plans,
etc.
More profoundly, this results from leaving room for ini-
tiatives, creativity, for each person to breathe, providing
meaning to action, allowing each and every member to be
more than simple stonecutters but true cathedral builders,
which these organizations lead at an exceptional level of
performance.
In the background, the team principle induces very
different management modes than those that remain
the habit today, based on the development of horizon-
tal cooperations (within or between operational teams,
between ﬁeld teams and support teams, etc.) and vertical
cooperations, those set up along the chain of com-
mand.
Driving and leading an organization in teams for allowing
them to reach the summits means breathing a dual energy
into it; a ‘‘top-down’’ energy which, by giving perspectives
and authorizations (spaces for autonomy and creativity) pro-
vides momentum and a ‘‘bottom-up’’ energy the one of
initiatives, actions leading to progress, taking processes in
hand, . . ..
This is a management style guided by the obses-
sion for simplicity (in organizations and systems but
also in human relations) and by the concern for the
group result, which is characterized by the exemplar-
ity, commitment, and charisma of its managers, who
recognize and enhance the results, who make one
proud.
Solidarity and complicity within the team, coopera-
tion between teams, and subordination to the whole
of the business, these are the qualities of this form
of organization, the third pillar of enduring qual-
ity.
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ummary
ecause they aim to recenter and concentrate the energy
nd skills of the entire business’s actors on value added tasks
y progressively eliminating all others, because they shed
ight on the future by giving meaning and perspectives, these
hree principles produce true growth dynamics in the busi-
ess and assist its members in their growth, making them
roud notably in developing their sense of utility as well as
heir own capital: their employability. They contribute to
aking the company an adventure with its successes and
ifﬁculties and to returning people to a place they never
hould have lost.
uture perspectives
he new demands induced by the deep changes in the
ocioeconomic order have ﬁrst of all led to revising prac-
ices, how things are done. This ﬁrst level of modiﬁcation
ery quickly collided with the organizations already in place,
heir complexity, their compartmentalization, the dilution
f decision making, the loss of a sense of responsibility.
hanging or making organizations evolve has proved to be
ore than a simple technical exercise. Every organiza-
ion is the reﬂection of the business culture to which it
elongs. We therefore cannot be content to play the role
f simple mechanics of processes and systems of organiza-
ions to lead our businesses along the post-Taylorism road
f fatal quality and agility. This is a profound change in
ulture; it is then by diffusion that this new culture will
e transformed into organizations and their daily opera-
ions.
It is indeed the Executive Teams and the Managers, at
ll levels, who incarnate and pass on culture. They must
herefore rethink their attitude. It can be described in four
ords: belief, commitment, boldness and trust. Belief in
hese principles that have been detailed above, encour-
ging one to defend and promote them in both word and
eed; boldness to think and to dare to do otherwise,
haking the certainties and the preconceived ideas; com-
itment in action by giving up that part of power that
llows teams to progress, but also by showing solidarity
nd being available in the ﬁeld like true trainers; trust
which is bestowed) and credibility (the trust one gains)
rst by taking an interest in the working conditions and in
emoving ‘‘the pebbles from the shoes’’, so to speak, then
n providing the means to progress, and ﬁnally in showing
ecognition.
High-performance organizations are like an iceberg: the
merged part represents the company’s practices and as
e proceed deeper and deeper, we found the culture, then
he spirit of a team in movement, and ﬁnally the collective
mbition.
An efﬁcient and long-lasting business is therefore a place
f creation and learning: performance is ﬁrst and foremost
human affair, not a system.onclusion (M. Le Bourg)
n light of this presentation, we should be able to ﬁt the puz-
le pieces together. Managing risks in the operating room, a
Sp
p
a
p
r
D54
articular form of a quality approach, should no longer be
erceived as a succession of sporadic measures but rather
reﬂection and commitment at every moment aiming for
ermanent improvement. We are invited to a true cultural
evolution.
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